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Childhood as cognition
- or taking Ariès at his word
Karen Stanbridge
“In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist.” So wrote Philippe Ariès
(1962, 128) in Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (hereafter,
Centuries). Originally published in the French (Ariès 1960), Ariès’s book was a wa-
tershed in childhood studies, the first widely-read work [1] that argued children
and childhood were socially constructed. 
Ariès presented evidence that modern western understandings of children as naïve but emo-
tionally treasured, and childhood as a carefree place that must be sheltered from the adult
world, were not natural and universal but were relatively recent phenomena that had only
appeared since the middle of the 18th century or so. Before that, Ariès said, childhood was
an insignificant stage of life, children (particularly infants) were not “counted” as family
members, and those who did survive were privy to and participated fully in adult life from
the age of seven, often earlier.
Ariès’s provocative statement spawned many pages of academic debate, especially in
history, where medieval scholars argued over its meaning and veracity.[2] Many interpreted
Ariès’s statement as a “slur on the Middle Ages” (Cunningham 1998, 1197) and sought evi-
dence to rescue parents of the period from disgrace by demonstrating that they did indeed
hold a conception of childhood. Contrary to what they believed Ariès was claiming,[3] the-
se scholars maintained that medieval parents noticed their children, loved them, showed
them affection and invested emotionally in them.
If  Ariès inspired new debates in history,  he also motivated researchers in the social
sciences to begin to look at children and childhood in a different way. He is by most ac-
counts the father of the “new sociology of childhood” [4] whose adherents relocate child-
hood studies from their traditional place in education and psychology to the centre of social
scientific inquiry. Although their focus and methods may vary, they share two broad aims:
to demonstrate that children and childhood are socially constructed, i.e. that modern wes-
tern understandings of these phenomena are not essential, but have emerged out of the par-
ticular historical, political, economic, social and religious circumstances that have characte-
rised western development; and to emancipate children and childhood from the bounds of
these modern constructions. They wish to acknowledge children as “beings” rather than
“becomings” (Qvortrup 1994) and celebrate their agency and their role(s) in social life as
creators rather than just passive receptors of culture. For many, this involves study of the
different childhoods that exist within countries and around the globe to show that children
who depart from the western model cannot so easily be dismissed as deviants or victims
(see for example O’Connell Davidson 2005).
New sociology of childhood researchers thus follow the path of scholars of race and
ethnicity, of gender, and of other mis- or underrepresented perspectives: to challenge “com-
mon sense” and “natural” understandings of people and show how they vary across time
and place; and to “empower” the powerless by bringing to light their hitherto ignored cont-
ributions to history and to social life. Thanks in part to Ariès, these researchers have produ-
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ced some excellent scholarship that has gone a long way toward deconstructing western no-
tions of children and childhood as universal and “natural.”
But have they gone far enough? As much ground as new scholars of childhood have co-
vered elaborating upon Ariès’s thesis, some of the possibilities of his study remain unanaly-
sed. This is because the field has not taken Ariès at his word and considered the cognitive
implications of his (in)famous statement. Reflecting on how the recent “cognitive turn” in
the social sciences might inform childhood studies, and drawing upon work by scholars
whose research has pioneered or been informed by that “turn,” such as Rogers Brubaker,
Karen Cerulo, Paul Dimaggio and Eviatar Zerubavel, I argue that to more fully deconstruct
childhood, scholars of childhood should continue to press past their (albeit illuminating)
accounts of how the conditions and classification of childhood have varied across time and
place, and ponder why and how modern westerners have come to enact “childhood as a
condition” in the first place, what forces and factors have encouraged modern westerners to
“think” young people in this way.
Ariès can help in this task because Centuries makes the case that it has not always been
so. If, as he says, the idea of childhood did not exist in the past, it follows that people did
not “think” children in the same way as modern westerners do: they were cognitively una-
ware of childhood in the modern sense, as the condition suffered by people of a particular
age. This means that childhood in the Middle Ages was not only different from its modern
version (it obviously was, as historians have established), but that it really was inconcei-
vable; the cultural tools on which modern westerners draw to evoke and sustain childhood
were unavailable. After elucidating the notion of childhood as cognition, I explore Ariès’s
text for evidence supporting the contention that medieval society lacked a cognitive aware-
ness of childhood. I find that Centuries does indeed support a conception of childhood as
cognition, and end on some of the implications that such an approach for childhood studies
more generally.
Childhood as cognition
I begin in what may seem an unlikely place: the scholarship of a political sociologist. In so-
me of his recent works, Rogers Brubaker (2004; Brubaker et al. 2006) ponders the influen-
ce of social constructivism on race and ethnic studies and on the study of nationalism.
Scholars in this field, he says, now routinely assert that “race,” “ethnicity,” and “nationa-
lism” are fluid concepts, the features of which vary with time and place. Nevertheless, the-
se same scholars often continue to write about “races,” “ethnicities,” and “nations” as if
they constitute real and uniform groupings of people. Thus, while they reiterate that “race”
is meaningless from a biological perspective and is a socially constructed phenomenon (ac-
counting  for  its  invariable  enclosure  in  parentheses),  many  still,  for  example,  include
“race” as an independent variable in their analyses of social phenomena. Although they
acknowledge the “fluidity” of ethnicity and ethnic belonging, they continue to engage in
studies of “ethnic conflict” between “ethnic groups.” These scholars recognise that such
classifications are contingent, but they end up confirming those classifications through ana-
lyses that treat them as an objective reality.
The result, says Brubaker (2004, 10), is that “race” and ethnicity as categories of ethno-
political practice are endorsed as categories of social analysis. Now there is nothing wrong
with exploring how “race” and ethnicity are used by people to understand and explain their
own and others’ self-perceptions and actions in day-to-day practice. Such research has shed
important light on aspects of behaviour and identity that were hitherto hidden. But social
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scientists that study the construction of these phenomena across time and place must be ca-
reful, says Brubaker, not to verify and perpetuate them in the process of explaining them.
Analysing a conflict between “ethnic groups,” for example, invariably homogenises mem-
bers of those groups. Ethnicity is approached as a sort of “condition” with which a group is
uniformly afflicted (the manner in which ethnicity tends to be understood and conveyed in
practice), rather than the mutable, actively negotiated and differentially salient phenome-
non that constructivists have demonstrated it to be (and that researchers should confirm in
their scholarly analyses). Ethnicity is thus overdetermined and the complex and varied inte-
ractions required to evoke and sustain its many guises as a basis for social action (conflict
in this case) in any particular circumstance are muted.
Brubaker and his colleagues (2006) have demonstrated empirically the analytical limita-
tions of this “ethnicity-as-condition” approach in their years-long study of a community
that failed to erupt in ethnic violence despite the sustained presence of numerous predic-
tors. Attempts by community leaders to foster ethnic animosities among citizens failed be-
cause people did not “live” their ethnicities day to day in ways that might transform such
ethnic “calls to arms” into group action. The study confirms that ethnicity must not only be
a salient means by which people “know” themselves and others to incite conflict but needs
also to be enacted in ways that resonate with individuals in their daily interactions and in-
terpretations of their social worlds. Still, researchers who should know better continue to
express frustration that ethno-nationalism resists “systematic study” by manifesting itself in
so many and in such varied forms (Smith 1994, 3). It appears that scholars who employ the
“ethnicity-as-condition” approach to analyses of ethnic conflict risk forgetting that real eth-
nicity (or “race” or “national identity”) is not “donned” so much as enacted, and is thus a
more fickle purveyor of social action than their analyses may suggest.
I would offer that something similar happens in studies of childhood. It is now standard
practice to cite Ariès and reiterate the uncontested part of his thesis: that children and child-
hood are not universal or natural conditions but socially constructed. But there remains a
tendency among scholars of childhood to talk about childhood as a “condition” afflicting
individuals within a certain (albeit somewhat elastic) age range. This is perhaps most evi-
dent among scholars concerned with children and childhood (as well as youth and adoles-
cence, adulthood and “the elderly” – see Laz 1998) as social problems, a focus that can per-
petuate the notion that people can “really” be divided into such homogeneous age catego-
ries even as it reveals the historical and cultural fluidity surrounding the treatment and ex-
periences of people thus classified. But it is also evident in more nuanced understandings
of childhood such as those employed in studies that explore how age categories themselves
are social rather than simple extensions of biology.
Although these studies draw important attention to the fact that periods of life are and
have been variously conceived, they can still hold at their base a notion of development
that presumes continuity in the way people conceive of aging across time and place. Scho-
lars concerned with the sociology of age (as opposed to “aging”) note an inclination in so-
ciological research to treat age as an objective chronological fact even while the meanings
attached to different ages are permitted to vary historically and culturally (Laz 1998, 91-
94).[5] This research takes as given that human development “really” coincides with years
since birth. But chronological age is no more a fact than are the features associated with
age categories in modernity. Chronological age, like all conceptions of age, are “made im-
portant in particular social and historical contexts and in interaction” (Laz 1998, 92, emp-
hasis in the original).[6] By treating chronological age as fact, this research forgets that ho-
wever age is perceived at a particular time and place, it is enacted, “accomplished” as Che-
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ryl Laz (1998) puts it, through interaction with others and surrounding culture and institu-
tions. In childhood studies, it can perpetuate the “natural-ness” and immutability of the mo-
dern propensity to link chronological age and development or maturation and so privileges,
however unintentionally, modern conceptions of childhood over other possibilities.
All this is not to say that research on children and youth as a social problem, or on the
stages of childhood as flexible (yet still chronologically bound) categories is misinformed
or illegitimate. Such research has revealed previously hidden assumptions surrounding mo-
dern western understandings of young people and dispelled tendencies, among academics
at least, to approach these categories (and the beliefs and behaviours associated with them)
as if they are natural. Nor is there anything wrong with social researchers acknowledging
that people may spontaneously perceive and understand themselves and others according to
these classifications, and studying the outcomes of actions taken in accord with these per-
ceptions. But using these classifications of practice as the foundations for analysis is un-
helpful when it is their unproblematic nature, their seeming “natural-ness” as bases for so-
cial action, that scholars are trying to explain. So what Brubaker says about “race” and
“ethnicity” applies to children and childhood: it is not that these phenomena have been de-
constructed improperly, but that they have not been deconstructed enough. To do this, Bru-
baker advocates treating such concepts as cognitive rather than concrete, as mental means
by which we categorise the world rather “given” phenomena or conditions “out there.” 
This goes beyond pondering how and why “race” or “childhood” are understood and acted
upon in a particular way in a particular context (although this is still an important step), to-
ward contemplating the foundations of how modern westerners come to “think” of their
own and others’ identities and behaviours in terms of “race” and “childhood” (as opposed
to something else) and the processes and conditions that call them to mind.
Brubaker draws upon the literature comprising the recent “cognitive turn” in the social
sciences to help explain his perspective.[7]  Very generally, the cognitive turn is represen-
ted by social science researchers concerned with the intersection of cognitive psychology
with their fields. In sociology, the approach has had the biggest impact on the study of cul-
ture. Sociologists of culture recognise that culture is not the uniform phenomena it was un-
derstood to be forty years ago; it is more than just the “stuff” that people acquire through
socialisation and evoke unproblematically when needed (Dimaggio 1997, 264). Rather, cul-
ture is fragmented and inconsistent. It is comprised of “rule-like structures” to be sure, but
these structures are enacted by individuals differentially and often strategically, used as a
sort of “tool kit” (Swidler 1986) in social action.
Some sociologists of culture have noted that this more complex conceptualisation of
culture and its active (if not always conscious) employment by people in different circums-
tances melds well with the discovery by cognitive psychologists that humans perceive and
interact with the world “out there” according to mental frames or schemata that they acqui-
re through varied social experiences. While cognitive psychologists continue to focus on
elucidating the individual or universal components of these schemata, sociologists try to
understand their social determinants, the social factors and forces that influence their deve-
lopment and that shape the way people come to “think,” organise and negotiate a world that
is, without schemes, a chaotic jumble of stimuli. Of obvious and special interest to sociolo-
gists is the consistency evident in schemata and consequent social action across groups of
people, the uniformity displayed by people in the ways they make sense of the world. Cog-
nitive sociologists explore how and why particular schemata (because individuals hold ma-
ny, even contradictory, schemata on which they draw to make sense of their circumstances)
become more or less salient in certain contexts, as well as the conditions under which some
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schemata become so normalised, evoked so automatically across populations, that they are
sustained in institutional form. Such schemata are most likely to be understood by their
“thinkers” as natural, inherent, rather than socially-acquired means to classify the world.
To clarify, we can look to how Brubaker says the cognitive approach can be effectively
applied to the study of ethnicity. Instead of talking about “ethnic groups,” he says, scholars
of ethnicity should, in addition to specifying how people conceive of ethnicity in a particu-
lar instance (the characteristics of ethnicity that are of import in this case), ask when, how
and why they evoke this “ethnicity scheme” as the means to help them organise the world
and make sense of their and others’ actions. To understand an ethnic conflict, researchers
should ask about the conditions that have contributed to that conflict being conceived by
participants and/or observers (because these do not always coincide), as an “ethnic” one. In
other words, how and why has ethnicity acquired a salience so significant in this case that
people have evoked the “ethnic scheme” to interpret and act upon the hostilities as opposed
to some other frame? Notice that this approach conceives of ethnicity as enacted rather than
a condition that people either “have” or “do not have,” a view more consistent with current
understandings of ethnicity as contingent and culture use as active, often strategic. Also, by
allowing the cognitive salience of the ethnic scheme to vary with interpersonal, institutio-
nal and other conditions, it permits (as Brubaker and his colleagues (2006) themselves have
demonstrated) analysis of the negative case: why the “ethnic scheme” has not been evoked
in any uniform manner in other cases.
This same approach can inform the study of childhood. Just as scholars of ethnicity
should examine the “ethnic scheme” and the conditions under which it has become espe-
cially  salient  in  people’s  understanding  and  interpretation  of  social  action,  scholars  of
childhood should ask why and under what conditions modern westerners have come to
enact childhood, how they have come to evoke, automatically, the “childhood scheme” to
“think” and act upon young people, as opposed to something else. That there could be a
“something else” is, however, more difficult to grasp in this case than when discussing eth-
nicity; that a negative case is possible, circumstances under which the childhood scheme is
not evoked in response to youngsters, is harder to imagine, so naturally is it executed.
This is where we can turn to Ariès for help. For if, as he says, the idea of childhood did
not exist in medieval society, then it follows that people of that era were cognitively unable
to conceive of childhood and hence (re)enact it in their everyday lives. This means that me-
dieval culture must have lacked the cultural “tools” for people to construct, employ and
sustain a cognitive map of childhood; absent were the norms, values, symbols, conventions,
institutional frameworks, macro structures and so forth that would have compelled them to
“think” childhood and use it as a basis for their understandings of themselves and others.
Note  that  this  is  not  the  same thing as  saying that  medieval  society did not  notice
youngsters or even conceive of them differently than adults, nor does it mean that its mem-
bers did not love or cherish children. Rather it means that medieval society was unable to
conceive of childhood as a condition distinguishable from adulthood by the “particular na-
ture” (Ariès 1962, 128) of its sufferers, a nature so exceptional that they required an ever-
expanding inventory of separate and special  considerations and treatments.  The Middle
Ages lacked the cultural instruments on which people could draw to sustain “childhood” as
a distinct category to organise their lives and use as a consistent basis for their actions and
understanding the actions of others.
To conceive of childhood as cognition, then, is to conceive of childhood as enacted in
people’s day to day lives as they employ culture and individual (culturally-acquired) know-
ledges to help them evoke and sustain this cognitive scheme that allows them to make sen-
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se of their world. What evidence does Ariès provide to support the contention that such me-
chanisms did not exist in medieval society?
Ariès as cognitive historian
To discern the cultural tools that were absent in medieval society to fashion and sustain the
cognitive scheme of “childhood” we must be aware of the cultural tools that are present in
modern society that help to reproduce it. What is the cultural basis of the propensity of mo-
dern westerners to see and think and treat young people as suffering a nature distinct from,
adults?
It is useful here to highlight what James et al. (2005) have termed the temporality of
childhood, the reality that a society’s perception of children is a product of the way that so-
ciety perceives aging, and in a broader sense, time. In western modernity, time is unders-
tood to be linear and commodified (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, cited in James et al. 2005,
61-62). Aging is perceived in much the same way, a linear and limited process, understood
to advance chronologically in a regular sequence of months and years toward death. But in
modern culture as in any culture, time and aging signify more than the simple calculation
of time passing; people assign meaning to these processes. In modernity, time can be mana-
ged, made the most of, or squandered. The aging process is similarly judged. The death of a
child in  modernity is not  dispassionately noted for  its  brevity with  respect to years  or
months lived. It is mourned as a life “cut short,” a “waste” of a life/time. The result is that,
in modernity as “[i]n any particular culture or at any specific historical moment, ‘the child’
is a product of the ways in which the process of ageing is qualitatively, rather than simply
quantitatively, accounted for” (James et al. 2005, 62-63). The view that people engage with
age, actively evaluate and interpret it in their interactions, is encompassed in Cheryl Laz’s
(1998) notion of “age as accomplished.” To accomplish age, one’s own and others’, invol-
ves attaching cultural meaning to the “objective” criteria of aging; it “[r]equires that indivi-
duals use and interpret available resources, have emotional reactions, and act accordingly”
(Laz 1998, 106).
It is modern understandings of time and hence aging as linear and limited phenomena
that press forward relentlessly, as irreversible trends whose earlier/younger manifestations,
once endured, are irretrievable, that lend modern childhood its particular complexion and
urgency. Childhood is where the potential that is embedded in these modern conceptions of
time and aging is clustered, in the bodies of the young; their maturation is observed as their
(and ultimately society’s) progress and possibility, or alternatively its failure. Thus chrono-
logical age – months or years since birth – is more than an objective characteristic of an in-
dividual in modernity. It is a proxy for where on that measurable and limited continuum
that comprises the modern life course the person resides and hence a crucial marker of
childhood. Chronological age signals to modern individuals the host of cultural meanings
affiliated with modern childhood, permitting them, as Laz (1998) says,  to formulate an
emotional reaction and act accordingly.
Notice that this  conception of childhood does not derive from the characteristics of
children. That modern children are taken to be irrational, incompetent, naïve, dependent
and so on constitutes, rather, people’s response to the condition of childhood (which scho-
lars have confirmed is historically and culturally variable), not its determinant. These featu-
res comprise the perceptions and bases for social action that derive from the classification.
While they are associated with the childhood scheme in that they may be evoked when that
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scheme becomes salient, the scheme itself derives from and is conditioned by “deeper” for-
ces: modern conceptions of time and aging.
It would follow, then, that if medieval societies were cognitively unaware of childhood,
then the notions and representations of time and age that permeate and organize modern li-
fe must have been absent. In other words, cultural cues indicating that time and age are li-
near, limited and quantifiable, and that youngsters, as embodiments of the progress and po-
tential lodged in such a conception of aging, possess a particular nature that demands they
be considered apart, understood and treated in special ways, were unavailable to people in
the Middle Ages. Ariès presents evidence in Centuries (1962) that this was indeed the case.
Certainly, medieval society did not conceive of aging in the strict chronological, calculable
manner it is in modernity. Ariès writes about the popularity and persistence of the pseudo-
scientific model of the “ages of life” or “ages of man” (Ariès 1962, 18–25). The model was
originally conceived by philosophers and scientists of the 6th century B.C. but had by the
16th century “become common property…its concepts had entered into mental habits…in
everyday life” (Ariès 1962, 19). The “ages” varied in number over the centuries and were
not bound by chronological age, but corresponded roughly with “childhood” (which could
extend to middle age), “youth” (which encompassed people in the “prime of life”) and “old
age.” They continued to be represented in profane iconography throughout the middle ages
and into the 19th century. It was not until the modern period, Ariès suggests, that the see-
mingly fixed and natural association between chronological age and aging began to take
hold.
This “looser” understanding of aging – an understanding that modern westerners might
consider lax and inexact – is evident in Ariès detailed discussion of the emergence in Fran-
ce of a vocabulary to describe children (Ariès 1962, 25–30). Until the 17th century, the
French had words to refer to only three ages: childhood, youth, and old age. Before that the
word “child” was not associated with chronological age but the condition of dependence; it
was only by leaving the state of dependence that one could leave “childhood.” Indeed, such
ambivalence toward childhood and chronological age continued well into the modern pe-
riod, the 19th and even 20th centuries, with respect to the smallest children (the word for
infant did not achieve widespread use until the 1800s) and adolescents, whose “awareness”
as a stage of life characterised by the “combination of purity, physical strength, naturism,
spontaneity and joie de vivre” (Ariès 1962, 30) only appeared in the 18th century and did
not congeal until after WWI.
Never mind its association with aging, chronological age itself, as a descriptive feature
of individuals, was of little significance in medieval and early modern societies. Indeed,
Ariès speaks of the “hostility” of the people of France toward the recording of chronologi-
cal age in parish records, and the two centuries (16th–18th centuries) that it took for them
to accept this method of “abstract accounting” as a regular practice (Ariès 1962, 16); he
describes the regular appearance of dates on family portraits (to establish the family and its
members in time) as occurring only after the 16th century and how before that “it was an
uncommon and difficult thing to remember one’s age exactly” (Ariès 1962, 18). In fact,
Ariès writes, it was considered impolite to refer directly to one’s chronological age until in-
to the 18th century.
But if medieval and early modern societies lacked the cultural tools to enact aging as
the modern process of “counting down” chronological age – and childhood as the earliest
and hence most significant, developmentally-speaking, stage of that process – it was none
so evident as in the absence of institutions organised on the basis of chronological age. Per-
haps most significantly, given how much of modern childhood is expected to unfold in edu-
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cational institutions, and that modern schooling systems are structured almost exclusively
by means of chronological age, medieval schools did not differentiate students by chrono-
logical age; people of various of ages could be found in the same classroom. This was not
because there were not enough students for separate classes, but because “the correspon-
dence between age and studies [was] a concept foreign to the Middle Ages” (Ariès 1962,
152). “It was the subject being taught that mattered,” writes Ariès (1962, 153); one was just
as likely to see an adult as a “precocious boy” studying the same lesson, and “children bet-
ween ten and thirteen sitting next to adolescents between fifteen and twenty” (Ariès 1962,
330). Interestingly, Ariès notes that indications of precocity disappeared between the 16th
and 19th centuries with the gradual establishment of an age-graded education system. Whi-
le children who had finished their schooling by the age of twelve or thirteen may have
struck 17th century observers as unusual but admirable, “at the beginning of the nineteenth
century precocity was regarded with suspicion” (Ariès 1962, 228). “Performances [of pre-
cocity] would not longer be tolerated,” writes Ariès, “once they were regarded as infrac-
tions of the special nature of childhood” (Ariès 1962, 196).
Such indifference to chronological age in the schools continued into the 18th century, a
“resistance to other factors of mental transformation [that] marks it as a fundamental attitu-
de to life” (Ariès 1962, 154). The mixing of ages in schools reflected the more general “mi-
xing” of people in medieval society, a life that Ariès describes as exceedingly sociable and
“collective” and that “carried along in a single torrent all ages and classes” (Ariès 1962,
411). It was an existence in which “people lived in a state of contrast; high birth or great
wealth rubbed shoulders with poverty, vice with virtue, scandal with devotion.” Yet, “this
medley of colours caused no surprise” (Ariès 1962, 414); “the old society concentrated the
maximum number of ways of life into the minimum of space and accepted, if it did not im-
pose, the bizarre juxtaposition of the most widely different classes” (Ariès 1962, 415). Rea-
ding Ariès’s descriptions of medieval life it appears that such structures would not support
the same sorts of categories of belonging and exclusion that characterise western thought
and institutions today. Certainly the structures that sustain childhood as a category of being
defined by chronological age were unavailable, unnecessary, indeed inconceivable.
So Ariès work presents some evidence that medieval society – into early modern society
– lacked the cultural tools to enact childhood. The fixed and perceived-natural link between
chronological age and aging that is present in modernity did not exist in the periods Ariès
describes. Aging seems to have been understood as a much looser process of lessening de-
pendence, differently experienced, and chronological age an insignificant, for a long time
deliberately ignored, characteristic of individuals. Such an understanding of aging could
not uphold a conception of childhood as obviously and perceptively distinct, as chronologi-
cally specified, as in modernity, the “place” where potential and possibility is clustered.
The cultural cues that could evoke and sustain such an understanding of childhood only ap-
peared gradually, over the very long term, as modernity encroached.
Ariès (1962, 16) points to the growth of the modern state and the “exactness…[it] requi-
res of its registrars” as a key force institutionalising chronological age as a key signifier of
a person’s being, a view later echoed by others including Pierre Bourdieu (1994). More im-
portant here, however, is how Ariès’s evidence aligns with the conception of childhood as
cognition.  Because the  cultural  “tools”  required to  conceive and employ the childhood
scheme to social understanding and action were unavailable or at best insignificant in me-
dieval into early modern societies, childhood could not exist.
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Implications
Ariès’s explosive statement concerning childhood can now be reformulated in light of a
cognitive approach to childhood:  “In medieval society the fixed and seemingly natural link
between chronological age and aging that exists in modernity was not enacted because
aging and time were not understood in the modern sense – linear, limited and quantifiable.
Hence, the idea of childhood – the scheme or mental frame by which people perceive and
understand youngsters within a certain range of chronological age as categorically distinct
and possessing a special nature – did not exist.” This lacks the parsimony of the original.
But stated in this way, his statement becomes less controversial. For it does not suggest that
there were no children in medieval society, or that medieval society did not notice children,
or grant them any special dispensations for their age. Neither does it only suggest that the
expectations associated with medieval childhood and the experiences that followed them
diverged from modern western childhood, although this is incontrovertible in light of his
study and later histories of childhood. Rather, to take Ariès at his word means to conceive
of Centuries as supporting a conception of childhood as cognition, a mental scheme that is
enacted, created and reproduced by individuals continually seeking to make sense of them-
selves and others’ actions by drawing on cultural resources both personal and structural. In
concluding that childhood did not exist in medieval society, then, Ariès can be understood
to have meant that medieval society could not enact childhood, it did not have the resources
on which its members could draw to “think” and act upon childhood.
Holding them back was a very loose conception of aging as progressing in broadly defi-
ned stages defined more by dependency than age, and a widespread indifference to the sig-
nificance of chronological age as an indicator of a person’s being. In such an environment,
it seems the features of childhood – incompetence, irrationality, dependence, naivety and
potential – could be more widely distributed, disconnected from chronological age. This is
in contrast to modernity where, somewhat perversely, observable manifestations of age are
secondary in evaluative importance to chronological age; it is,  in the final instance,  on
chronological age that modern westerners and their institutions depend to assess themsel-
ves and others and on which membership in childhood is based. This is none so evident as
in the emergence and institutionalisation of “chronometrical childhood” by the early twen-
tieth century, a psycho-medical practice that spread gradually into larger western society
that classified children of different chronological age – down to the month in the case of
the very young – against the “normal” child (LaRossa and Reitzes 2001). In this process,
elaborate boundaries were drawn to break down the naturally rapid yet notoriously variable
i.e. actual development of children, into a more orderly and quantifiable process, further
privileging chronological age over any other marker as an indicator of a child’s develop-
ment. Today, so automatic is this conception of children as maturing chronologically accor-
ding to an average prescribed path of stages of development, so routine are the assumptions
surrounding the kind of childhood that should flow from this path, so omnipresent are the
institutions that sustain these conceptualisations, that they are understood in modern wes-
tern societies as natural and self-evident.[8]
How and why modern western culture and institutions have unfolded in a way as to ma-
ke chronological age such a significant mental “trigger” to understand and organise our be-
haviours and expectations is a compelling question, but here I just wish to highlight the rea-
lity that it has not always been thus, as Ariès has shown us. Indeed, others have shown us
as well,  although they have not elaborated upon the cognitive  implications of their  re-
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search. Recall the observation by James et al. (2005) that childhood is temporal, linked to a
society’s understanding of time and how its members “comprehend and evaluate, rather
than simply calculate, the passage of time” (James et al. 2005, 62). The authors emphasise
the influence of the structural arrangements of society on this process of “age making.” But
given the “brainwork” obviously required from people to, as they say, “comprehend” and
“evaluate” time and age in the manner they suggest, activities to achieve “age conscious-
ness,” the authors imply that these phenomena are as much cognitive as structural. Certain-
ly the “gestalt shift” in people’s conceptualisation of newborns that they relate accompa-
nied structural changes in medical science and healthcare in 19th century England suggests
this process of “redefining” the very young (from creatures naturally susceptible to death to
beings whose death can be prevented) altered the way people “think” newborns. Indeed,
according to the research they cite, the change modified the way people perceived infants
so well that it “made it hard indeed for those who had shifted to understand how other
might see things differently” (Wright 1987, 197, cited in James et al. 2005, 64) suggesting
real change to the mental schema brought to mind by an infant and the social actions that
ensue. We can further ponder the cognitive implications of the well-known and well-stu-
died decline of infant mortality on understandings of children and childhood more general-
ly, their meaning and possibilities. The far-reaching social-structural consequences of the
increase in longevity during the twentieth century (of which infant survival was a part) that
one sociologist of age relates (Riley 1987, 7) was surely accompanied by changes to the
cognitive “maps” by which people made sense of young people as the personal/experiential
resources  as  well  as  the  structural  resources  from  which  people  drew  to  qualify
“childhood” were transformed.
And it is this, perhaps, that is the most exciting feature of a cognitive approach to child-
hood: it encourages us to deconstruct modern childhood to the extent that we can approach
and recapture the other understandings of childhood, the discarded “possibles” as Bourdieu
(1992) calls them, that existed before the calcification of the modern version. We can thus
retrieve “the possibility that things could have been (and still could be) otherwise” (Bour-
dieu 1992, 4). And we know that other “possibles” existed, thanks again to the histories of
childhood inspired by Ariès. Reading Centuries, one is struck not only by how dissimilar
childhoods of the past were from the modern western model, but by how long it took for
modern notions of children and childhood to even begin to settle into stable configurations.
Until then, different – many opposing – understandings of children and childhood existed
together. Even as children were appearing more regularly as children (rather than miniature
adults) in paintings, as writers were elaborating on the charms of childhood, as middle-
class parents were delighting in their children as a form of entertainment, the mortality rate
of  children remained high, and people  regularly expressed an open callousness  toward
youngsters (Ariès 1962, 39-40, 130-131). And we have already seen how vestiges of the
medieval tendency to disregard chronological age continued to influence the organisation
of schooling until at least the 18th century. The competition among “possibles” is also evi-
dent in Karen Sanchez-Eppler’s (2005) recent work on childhood in nineteenth-century
America. Sanchez-Eppler paints a fascinating portrait of the many representations of child-
ren and childhood in America between the 1820s and 1870s, a period of “flux” in American
culture when the meaning and experience of childhood was changing rapidly but unevenly
across class, region, gender and race. How and why other possible characterisations were
eventually discarded for the modern model are now questions that become open for analy-
sis.
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Philippe Ariès’s revelations in Centuries shook the field of childhood studies. This pa-
per suggests that the extent of his contribution to childhood studies may have yet to be fully
realised. While Ariès himself may have been an “accidental” cognitive historian, rereading
his work in this light can open new doors in childhood studies.
Endnotes
[1]  One of the first to note the historical variation in understandings of children and child-
hood was Norbert Elias (1978 [1939]; 1998 [1980]), who perceived a growing “separation”
between children and adults in Western societies over time. He attributed this change to the
larger “civilising process” he argued Western societies had suffered since at least Medieval
times, a long-term movement in Western cultures to suppress “uncivilised” behaviours by
internal, moral regulation.
[2] The scholarship is considerable, but is consolidated in Hugh Cunningham (1998) and
Margaret King (2007).
[3]  As Hugh Cunningham (1998, 1197) has noted, “idea” was the translation of Ariès’s ori-
ginal term in the French, sentiment, which conveys a somewhat different meaning.
[4]  Key scholars  in  this  field  include  Allison James,  Chris  Jenks,  Alan  Prout  and  Jens
Qvortrup  (see  especially  James,  Jenks  and  Prout  2005;  James  and  Prout  2004;  and
Qvortrup 1994).
[5]  Laz (1998) compares this tendency to the distinction made in 1960s and 1970s feminist
literature  between  “sex”  and  “gender”  that  conceived  of  the  former  as  objective  and
biological and only the latter as socially constructed.
[6]  There  are  (acknowledged)  similarities  in  the  way  Laz  (1998,  87,  n.  3)  conceives
of age as “accomplished” and Judith Butler’s (1990) work on gender as performative.
[7]  The following draws upon Paul DiMaggio (1997), and Eviatar Zerubavel (1998), and on
Karen Cerulo’s (2002) edited volume of contributions to cognitive sociology.
[8]  this has changed somewhat with the (1989) signing by most countries of the UN Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights  2008).  The  Convention includes  a  provision (Article  12)  stipulating  that
children’s views must be “given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the
child,” thus separating the institutionalised link between childhood (as in “not adulthood”
and hence irrationality) and age. Easier said than done, however, as signatories of the Con-
vention continue to either ignore or struggle with implementation of this principle (see Lee
1999).
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